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Democratic Transition and the Evolution of Mass Politics 
in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe 
Vincent E. McHale∗ 
Abstract: The comparative sociology of elections has been 
a central focus in the study of mass political behavior. Of 
special concern to pioneers such as Stein Rokkan have been 
comparative generalizations regarding the genesis and na-
ture of political conflicts and cleavages, and the structuring 
of mass politics around the poles of government and opposi-
tion. The principal task of this analysis is to examine the re-
cent electoral experience of two post-communist states -
Poland and Romania - as they confront the transition toward 
democratic rule. Both states have had a variety of signifi-
cant electoral consultations which enable us to identify pat-
terns of stability or change in aggregate voter alignments. 
Our approach at this stage has been to employ ecological 
data to draw out inferences about emergent patterns of elec-
toral alignments as they relate to government and opposi-
tion in these two societies. The findings suggest elements of 
both continuity and change. While some groups from the 
pre-Communist period experienced a political revival and 
secured electoral niches, the collapse of the Communist or-
der has given rise to new lines of cleavage not evident in the 
pre-Communist period. The First democratic elections ap-
peared to have been defining events in that they exposed 
long-standing ethnic, nationalist and regional cleavages 
which were suppressed by the Communist regime. Regional 
disparities in economic development also gained political 
salience and became a major factor in voting patterns. The 
articulation of these issues was greatly assisted by propor-
tional electoral laws. The evidence suggests an early "freez-
ing" of partisan differences which have begun to take shape 
around distinct bases of support in each society. 
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Introduction 
The comparative sociology of elections and electoral behavior has long been a 
central focus in the study of mass political behavior (Lipset and Rokkan, 
1967b, pp. 1-64). The decade of the late 1960's and early 1970's was especially 
fruitful from a theoretical vantage point as insightful scholars such as Stein 
Rokkan and others offered a number of innovative frameworks and schema for 
the comparison of party systems and electoral alignments in the context of 
national political development (Allardt and Littunen, 1964; Allardt and Rok-
kan, 1970; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967a; Rokkan, 1970). Of special concern to 
these scholars were comparative generalizations regarding the genesis and 
nature of political conflicts and cleavages in the structuring of mass politics in 
the liberal democracies of Europe. 
Europe constituted the prime database for analysis because of early exten-
sions of the franchise, significant party development, and a long tradition of 
representative government. In addition, scholars also sought to enrich this 
empirical base by extending their research beyond the major polities of conti-
nental Europe and the Anglo-American systems to include the developmental 
experiences of the smaller democracies, many of which had been ignored in 
previous comparative studies. 
Despite important theoretical advancements and a broadening of the data-
base, significant gaps remain in our knowledge of the developmental experi-
ence of Europe at large, especially those political systems located an the central 
and eastern peripheries. As long as these states remained under what was per-
ceived to be an hegemonic Communist political order, they were generally 
overlooked by comparativists, or considered to be beyond the range of contem-
porary analysis, even though most had functioned under pluralistic or quasi-
pluralistic conditions in the pre-World War 11 era (McHale, 1986; Roucek, 
1946). In fact, in some systems (e.g., Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland), the 
Communist regime did permit a type of limited or controlled pluralism which 
tended to preserve the political identities of selected older parties and interest 
groups. Most, however, functioned in a weakened state since strict quotas were 
established in terms of the upper limits of political representation (see McHale 
and Skowronski, 1983). 
The sudden, and, indeed, unexpected collapse of the Communist order has 
raised several analytical questions about political development in central and 
eastern Europe as the former Communist states confront the tradttion toward 
democratic rule. How much continuity exists in mass political alignments from 
the pre-Communist period? What appear to be the major cleavage lines in 
evidence following the First free elections in over forty years? (Berglund and 
Dellenbrant, 1994). What types of parties and party systems have been formed? 
(Kitschelt, 1992). What is the emergent basis of government and opposition? 
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Major political transitions such as we are witnessing in eastern and central 
Europe are very often accompanied by unanticipated consequences and sur-
prises. The survival and transformation of Communist parties is a case in point. 
In the wake of strong anti-Communist sentiment that had swept across Europe 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, most observers mistakenly thought the for-
mer ruling Communist parties would play little or no role in the post-
Communist political order, and that any association with the former Commu-
nist regime would be a political liability. In hindsight we see the fallacy in this 
perspective. First, having functioned as the ruling party for decades, Commu-
nist parties were much better organized than other indigenous political groups, 
and had provided the only real channels for coopting and training cadres in 
political and administrative skills. Second, although some efforts were made to 
preserve pre-Communist political formations and opposition groups, most had 
few political resources, some had been in exile, and virtually all had untested 
mass electoral bases. The noncommunist parties generally had a low level of 
political identification among their respective mass publics. Liberal parties, for 
example, many of which had pre-Communist roots, nourished high expecta-
tions for a central role in the post-Communist era, but found they had great 
difficulty moving beyond their narrow urban bases of support in countries with 
a large conservative peasantry such as Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. 
While other groups from the pre-Communist period such as the various 
peasant-based parties and nationalist groups did experience a political revival 
and secure electoral niches, the collapse of the Communist order actually gave 
impetus to new lines of cleavage that were not evident in the pre-Communist 
period. Juan Linz's observations an the political transformation of the Medi-
terranean from dictatorship to democracy in the 1970s suggested that the shape 
of the future party system depends not only an the continuity of old cleavages, 
but is also heavily influenced by the conditions prevailing during the transition 
period including the electoral system (Linz, 1967, p. 274). For example, the 
differential effects of economic reform across regions and classes introduced a 
new element of political conflict between perceived beneficiaries and potential 
losers in the new order. This conflict was apparent in the economic insecurity 
of the rural areas and older industrial regions, as well as the older age cohorts 
who tended to support or identify with the social and economic policies of the 
previous Communist regime. 
The First democratic elections also exposed deep-seated ethnic and regional 
cleavages which had simmered for years but were suppressed by the Commu-
nist regimes. Regional disparity in economic development - a source of protest 
and opposition politics in other European systems - suddenly gained political 
salience and appears to have become a major factor in voting patterns (McHale 
and Shaber, 1977; Rokkan and Urwin, 1982). Ethnic tensions found an effec-
tive outlet in both ethnic and nationalist parties which were greatly  
assisted by proportional electoral laws. Many of the new issues were
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not just economic or class-based, but included socioreligious differences and 
environmental concerns which by the late 1980s had achieved an established 
place on the European political agenda. 
The principal task of this analysis is to relate the recent electoral experience 
of these transformed states to the Body of existing literature dealing with the 
comparative sociology of European mass politics. A comprehensive analysis of 
central and eastern Europe is beyond the scope of a single article. Instead we 
will focus our attention an the post-Communist electoral experiences of two 
representative systems - Romania and Poland. Both states have had a variety of 
significant electoral consultations which enable us to identify and describe 
emergent patterns in aggregate voter alignments. Both systems also represent 
marked differences in political traditions. In Poland, aspects of a pluralist polity 
survived the Communist onslaught, whereas democratic institutions were al-
most nonexistent in recent Romanian history. 
The Lipset-Rokkan schema provides us with a useful analytical framework 
for structuring our inquiry into the initial stages of competitive politics in east-
ern Europe (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967b, pp 1-64). Among the major questions 
raised by Lipset and Rokkan for comparative analysis are these concerning the 
genesis of conflicts, cleavages, and oppositions within the national community, 
as well as the bases of current electoral alignments when viewed against his-
torically given alternatives. Lipset and Rokkan also postulate that the history of 
electoral politics and party development involves a sequence of successive 
changes around two major cross-cutting dimensions: territorial and functional. 
We can only address the most basic of these questions at this point given the 
brevity of the democratic experience and the lack of longitudinal information 
an electoral choice. Recent electoral outcomes represent our primary data. Our 
approach will be to examine the geography of the vote in Poland and Romania, 
and then assess its coincidence with other politically salient, geographically 
distributed characteristics of a social and economic nature. We see this as the 
first stage in a more comprehensive analysis. We are aware of the limitations 
and perils of over-reliance an aggregate ecological data; and while some reli-
able polling has taken place, we eagerly await the accumulation of a more 
extensive body of comparable survey data for hypothesis-testing and micro-
level analysis. Political cleavages - both territorial and functional - take an 
added meaning when viewed in a regional context. Our modest goal in this 
article is to employ electoral data to draw out inferences about emergent pat-
terns of electoral alignments in these two societies. 
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Romania 
Romania's transition to democraty represented a sharp break from the Commu-
nist past wich little preparation for the transition to a democratic order. A vio-
lent popular uprising ended the Communist regime in Romania in December 
1989. Ion Iliescu, a party official in the previous regime and president of the 
newly-formed National Salvation Front (FSN), won a landslide electoral vic-
tory with his party in the presidential and legislative races of May 1990. The 
political intolerance of the previous regime and the abruptness of transition 
created an organizational vacuum which was immediately flled by the FSN - a 
"catchall" formation composed of a substantial number of cadre from the for-
mer Communist party. Two other presidential candidates contested the 1990 
election. Radu Campeanu and Ion Ratiu did poorly, although each came to 
represent a discrete historical and ideological base in Romanian society. 
Several parties in opposition to the FSN also sought representation in the 
new parliament including the Peasant and Agrarian parties, the National Lib-
eral Party and the ethnic and regionally-based Hungarian Democratic Union. 
However, the opposition parties largely competed against each other instead of 
presenting a unified platform to counter the FSN. Politics during the transition 
period was also complicated by the existence of a small but vocal royalist sen-
timent in support of deposed and exiled King Michael 1. The former king had 
been the subject of various political maneuverings by groups including the 
National Peasants who advocated a restoration of the monarchy - although this 
was not their chief programmatic issue. 
A little more than a year after the First democratic elections, Romania hold a 
nationwide referendum in December 1991 to accept or reject a new constitution 
designed to replace an interim arrangement which had been in force since the 
December 1989 revolution. The 1991 referendum was a hastily contrived af-
fair, and the resulting low tumout suggested a confused electorate. The major 
opposition parties (National Liberal Party and Hungarian Democratic Union) 
had voted against the new constitution in parliament, but did not call for a 
boycott of the referendum as did the royalists. The Liberals claimed that the 
new constitution vested too muck power in the office of the president. The 
ethnic Hungarians expressed fear that the new constitution would legitimize a 
resurgent Romanian nationalism. The royalists argued that Romanian people 
should be consulted an restoration of the monarchy. The referendum was ac-
cepted by a vote 76.5 percent for and 21.3 percent against. Turnout was 54 
percent (about 8.5 million voting from a potential electorate of 16 million). 
The referendum was the second major electoral consultation in Romania 
since the end of the Communist regime in 1989, and as such provides us with 
an opportunity to assess patterns of electoral change from the initial legislative 
and presidential contests of May 1990. It is a good indicator of the emergent
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geographical bases of government and opposition in the immediate post-
communist period. We will focus on the correlates of the No vote at the judet 
level.1 
The distribution of No votes in the 1991 referendum can be viewed as an 
important indicator of an emerging and coalescing electoral opposition to the 
ruling FSN. A series of correlations will illustrate this point.2 As expected, the 
No vote was strongest in those judete with a high concentration of ethnic Hun-
garians (r = +.60) who have felt threatened by the growing nationalist senti-
ment of the current regime. The No vote averaged approximately 37 percent in 
the ethnic Hungarian areas (compared to 14.6 percent for the non-ethnic Hun-
garian areas) - ten percentage points over the 21 percent national average. 
The most important correlate of the No vote was the distribution of votes for 
Radu Campeanu, presidential candidate of the National Liberal Party in May 
1990. Campeanu's presidential vote had been closely tied to the electoral base 
of the Hungarian Democratic Union. The correlation between Campeanu's 
support in 1990 and the No vote in 1991 is extremely high (r = +.98). However, 
even more important is the observation that in every judet, the magnitude of the 
No vote exceeded Campeanu's 1990 presidential support by an average of 9.5 
percentage points. 
The No vote in 1991 appeared to take on the characteristics of a more gen-
eralized nationwide opposition to the current regime. While this opposition was 
founded on the electoral base established by Campeanu in 1990, it now ap-
peared to extend beyond the original ethnic Hungarian core areas of opposition. 
For example, if we examine the difference between Campeanu's 1990 support 
and the percent of No votes in each judet, we find that the largest increases in 
opposition voting were not necessarily in the ethnic Hungarian areas. This 
difference was uniformly positive across Romania and ranged from 3.6 to 16.1 
percentage points. The following non-ethnic Hungarian judete in eastern Ro-
mania registered some of the largest increases in opposition voting: Bacau 
(13.7%), Tulcea (12.9%), Vrancea (11.9%), Prahova (11.9%), and Dimbovita 
(11.1 %). 
Electoral opposition in Romania has cut significantly into the Base of FSN 
support, and we are not likely to see the overwhelming support (e.g., 80% and 
above) for the FSN in future electoral contests. The nature of this opposition
                                                          
1 The ecological information for Romania consists of subnational political and socioeconomic 
data measured at the judet level. Romania is divided into 40 judete plus the municipality of 
Bucharest and the Illfov agricultural sector. Data sources include Annuarl Statistic al Re-
publici Socialiste Romania (Directia Centrala de Statistica, 1986); Buletin de Informare 
Publica (Al Comisiei Nationale Pentru Statistica, Nr. 5/1990); Monitorul Oficial al Roma-
niei (Nr. 81-82/1990); and various issues of the Bucharest newspaper Dimitaeata. 
2 Pearson product moment correlations are reported throughout this article. The correlations   
vary from ±1.0 - a perfect relationship to 0.0 - no relationship. 
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appears to be largely cultural and political in nature at this stage, although there 
are economic overtones in evidence. The key to opposition-building in Roma-
nia in future elections is whether the various elements of discontent can coa-
lesce into a unified potent force to challenge the initial parliamentary and presi-
dential supremacy of Iliescu and the National Salvation Front (see Mungiu and 
Pippidi, 1994, pp. 357-359). In any case, the No vote in 1991 is likely to re-
main a significant benchmark for regime opposition in future elections in muck 
the same way as the No vote in post-World War II referenda an constitutional 
reconstruction in Greece, France, and Italy (see McHale and Paranzino, 1975). 
A second round of legislative and presidential elections was held in Roma-
nia in September and October 1992. These elections were the third major na-
tional consultation in three years, and the first under the new constitution rati-
fied in December 1991. The elections simultaneously renewed both houses of 
the legislature (Chamber and Senate) and resulted in a run-off ballot for the 
presidency. Although six candidates entered the race, the two presidential con-
tenders in the run-off were the former Communist leader and incumbent, Ion 
Iliescu, and a political unknown, Emil Constantinescu, who was supported by a 
coalition of opposition parties. 
The elections of 1992 were more complex than the simple binary nature of 
the 1990 contests. In this case, there was a clear distinction in voting patterns 
between the presidential and legislative elections. Several important party 
developments had occurred prior to the election campaign. In March 1992, the 
ruling FSN split into right and left factions. The "right" faction led by former 
prime minister Petre Roman retained the original FSN designation. The break-
away "left" faction was led by incumbent President Iliescu and renamed itself 
the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN). The opposition regrouped 
into a loose 18 party coalition known as the Democratic Convention of Roma-
nia (CRD) and rallied its support around Constantinescu an the run-off ballot. 
Finally, remnants of the former Communists regrouped as the Socialist Labor 
Party (PSM). 
The elections of 1992 confirmed our previous assessment regarding the 
probable evolution of electoral opposition in post-Communist Romania. The 
distribution of the No vote in 1991 suggested the emergence of a more general-
ized opposition to both the current regime and the FSN/FDSN from that mani-
fested in the First post-Communist elections in 1990. At the time of the 1991 
referendum, the electoral opposition had already began to erode the base of 
FSN support, and we had speculated that overwhelming electoral majorities for 
the FSN, in whatever guise, or its presidential candidate, would not be re-
peated. 
In Table 1, we have arranged the major electoral results an the basis of aver-
ages across all of the judete, and separately for the ethnic and non-ethnic 
judete. Although Iliescu was elected an the second ballot, the opposition had 
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Table 1: 
ETHNICITY AND THE ROMANIAN VOTE (Averages) 
Electoral Variable 
Total 
Judete 
(N=42) 
Ethnic 
Judete* 
(N=14) 
Non-Ethnic 
Judete 
(N=27) 
Iliescu, 1990 84.5%  70.4% 92.3% 
Iliescu, 1992 62.4 42.2 72.7
FSN, 1990 67.0 46.0 78.0
FDSN (Iliescu), 1990 47.0 33.0 55.0
FSN (Roman), 1992 18.0 18.0 18.0
Campeanu, 1990 11.6 24.8 4.8 
Ratiu, 1990 3.5 4.8 2.9
Opposition, 1990 15.1 29.6 7.7
No Vote, 1991 21.0 33.9 14.4
Constantinescu, 1992 37.8 57.6 27.6 
CDR, 1992 35.0 48.0 28.0
Opposition Gain,1992** 22.7 28.0 20.0 
* Judete with more than 12% ethnic minorities. 
** Percentage point difference between Constantinescu's 
vote in 1992 and the combined vote of Campeanu and 
Ratiu in 1990. 
gained considerable strength since 1990. Iliescu’s average presidential vote 
across the judete in 1990 was 85 percent; in 1992 his support an the second 
ballot dropped to a modest 63 percent. The average vote for the CDR was 35 
percent (compared to 9% and 6% for the Hungarian Democratic Union and 
National Liberal Party respectively in 1990). With an average vote of 38 per-
cent, Constantinescu's support in 1992 was considerably higher than the com-
bined votes of both Campeanu and Ratiu in 1990. The average gain in votes in 
1992 -the percentage point difference between Constantinescu's vote in 1992 
and the combined vote of Campeanu and Ratiu in 1990 - was 23 percentage 
points. Constantinescu's performance is significant considering that he was 
designated a presidential candidate only two months before the elections, and 
had spent most of his campaign introducing himself to the electorate. 
The emergent electoral opposition in Romania appears to be founded an the 
geographical and socioeconomic bases First established by Radu Campeanu 
(Liberal Party presidential candidate) in 1990. It began basically as an urban 
phenomenon with strong roots in the ethnic minority areas. Campeanu's candi-
dacy had been helped by signifcant support from the Hungarian Democratic 
Union. In 1992, Iliescu and his faction of the National Salvation Front achieved 
their best results in the 27 judete where less than 12 percent of
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the population was composed of ethnic minorities. Table 1 provides strong 
evidence that ethnicity is and will remain a potent factor in Romanian voting 
behavior and in shaping the post-Communist party system. 
The ethnic dimension in Romanian electoral politics is not confined to the 
Hungarian Democratic Union. Of equal importance to opposition-building in 
Romania has been the rise and continued growth of the nationalist parties such 
as the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR) and the Greater Romania 
Party (PRM). For these parties, the Romanian ethnic issue is the primary con-
cern. Both parties managed to overcome the 3 percent election threshold im-
posed for the 1992 election and have significant representation in both the 
Chamber and the Senate. 
Although the nature of electoral opposition in Romania continues to be pre-
dominantly cultural and political in nature, socioeconomic and developmental 
differences across Romania are also becoming increasingly important in differ-
entiating patterns of electoral choice between government and opposition. In 
some respects, this represents a continuation of historical divisions. Socioeco-
nomic cleavages and the urban-rural dichotomy formed the Basis for the Ro-
manian party system that had emerged in the pre-Communist period (Gilberg, 
1983). 
An examination of the correlations between the presidential vote in 1992 
and key developmental indicators (e.g., urbanization, employment, mortality 
rates, etc.) provides striking evidence that Romanian politics also reflects a 
potential cleavage between the developed and underdeveloped regions of the 
country. These key indicators, along with other variables measuring quality of 
life, have been aggregated using factor analysis into a single index of develop-
ment in order to assess its overall effect an the 1992 presidential vote. Our 
findings are presented in Table 2. 
Although the correlations are of modest magnitude overall, they clearly 
demonstrate that Iliescu's support in 1992 was drawn primarily from the under-
developed rural areas principally in southeastern Romania. His electoral base 
was characterized as non-urban, agricultural, with a lower living standard (as 
measured by higher mortality rates). On the basis of these relationships, one 
might speculate that Iliescu's support comes principally from the order, more 
conservative, threatened and deprived sectors of the population, who are more 
comfortable with continued social and economic guarantees and a slower pace 
of reform (see Datculescu, 1992, p. 128). 
In contrast, electoral support for the opposition candidate was located geo-
graphically in the more urbanized areas with higher levels of development and 
living standards. The city of Bucharest continued to be an important center of 
opposition support in much the same way as it was in the 1990 presidential 
election. 
When the ethnic factor is removed from the analysis in Table 2, the impor-
tance of developmental factors in voting behavior increases dramatically. 
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Table 2: 
SELECTED CORRELATES OF THE ROMANIANPRESIDENTIAL VOTE, 
1992 (N = 42 judete) 
Variable Iliescu* Constantinescu*
Iliescu, 1990 .92 -.91  
Campeanu, 1990 -.88 .87  
Ratiu, 1990 -.88 .56
Urban population -.41 (-.75)** .42 ( .64)** 
Rural population .40 ( .72) -.40 (-.63)
Industrial employment -.53 (-.44) .54 ( .44) 
Agricultural employment .45 ( .72) -.45 (-.63)
Mortality rate .48 ( .29) -.50 (-.27)
Development index*** -.48 (-.77) .48 ( .64) 
* Second ballot vote. 
** Correlations in parentheses are based an the 27 
judete having less than 12% ethnic minority popula-
tions.In effect, this removes the ethnicity factor 
from the relationships. 
*** Factor score index of development. Positive scores 
indicate "developed" judete, negative scores indicate 
"underdevelopment." 
The correlations in parentheses are based on the same relationships but re-
stricted to the 27 judete having fewer ethnic minorities in their populations. 
Once again, the results are not only significant in terms of the magnitude of the 
correlations (e.g., .70 and above), but striking in terms of their implications for 
Romanian politics. There is little doubt that in the non-ethnic areas of Romania, 
the 1992 presidential election could also be construed as a contest between 
"developed" and "underdeveloped" Romania. The most distinguishing factor in 
the presidential vote was the development index. 
The key factors of ethnicity and development can be combined into a re-
gression model which allows us to account for over two-thirds of the 1992 
presidential second ballot. In the following models, development is represented 
by the development index reported in Table 2, and ethnicity is measured as a 
binary variable (1 = ethnic judet; 0 = non-ethnic judet): 
Iliescu (1992) = 71.5 - 4.9(D) - 28.8(E) 
R=.83  R2=.68 
Constantinescu (1992) = 28.8 + 5.1(D) + 26.3(E)  
R=.82  R2=.67 
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Where: 
D = Development Index (factor scores)  
E = Ethnicity (binary variable) 
The shape of post-Communist politics in Romania continues to evolve with 
some features more clear than others. As expected, the umbrella-like National 
Salvation Front has started to disintegrate over ideology and personalities, 
although it may still be capable of coalescing around an identifiable candidate. 
The opposition made important gains in 1992, especially in the legislative 
arena, but it has a long way to go to challenge the dominance of the 
FSDN/FSN. There is evidence that the opposition has established an electoral 
base although the parties are still weak organizationally. 
Ethnicity clearly remains a divisive territorial issue among the Romanian 
electorate and represents an important core element of opposition support. Its 
effect an electoral behavior has been limited to the small number of judete (N = 
14) with large ethnically diverse populations, although the nationalist parties 
have been more inclined to support the government. In contrast, the political 
implications of developmental differences across Romania are more general in 
their influence an mass politics, and there is ample evidence to indicate that 
they are beginning to overshadow the narrow issue of ethnicity. Developmental 
differences have historical roots, especially in the urban-rural cleavage, and 
they are expected to play an even greater role in future elections and in shaping 
the emergent party system of post-Communist Romania. 
Poland 
The transition to democracy in Poland has been less abrupt and somewhat 
deeper than in Romania (see Jasiewicz, 1992a). Elements of civil society and a 
degree of pluralism managed to survive the Communist era. Poland, like Ro-
mania, has now experienced three major electoral contests in the post-
Communist period: a presidential election in 1990, and legislative elections in 
1991 and 1993. The two legislative elections were conducted under very differ-
ent electoral rules. As a result of extreme fragmentation in the aftermath of the 
1991 legislative election, the electoral law was changed to encourage a simpli-
fication of the party system in terms of parliamentary representation (see 
Jasiewicz, 1992c). The results were dramatic. Political representation in the 
Sejm dropped from 29 parties in 1991 to only 7 in 1993. 
Poland's transition to democracy began with a somewhat disorganized elector-
ate, although the battle lines between Solidarity and the Communist regime had 
been drawn earlier and extended throughout the 1980s. Pre-Communist era 
parties, such as the various peasant formations managed to retain  
their identity, and despite the "hegemonic" party system  
under Communist rule, various other socioeconomic, ethnic, and religious
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organizations were permitted a limited political role (Cieplak, 1983; Wiatr, 
1970). Partially-free elections in June 1989 resulted in Solidarity capturing all 
of the seats in the new second chamber of parliament and achieving significant 
representation in the Sejm (see Jasiewicz, 1992b). While the fully-free presi-
dential election of 1990 marked the end of the Communist order in Poland, it 
also opened the door to new oppositions unrelated to the Solidarity-Communist 
cleavage which had dominated Poland for almost a decade (see Jasiewicz, 
1992c). 
In the transition to democratic rule, the Polish electorate proved to be not all 
that different from electorates in Western Europe. Given a free choice under 
liberal electoral rules, all types of conflicts tended to emerge based on politi-
cally-salient divisions in Polish society. As this analysis will demonstrate, the 
major political cleavages in Poland display important continuities from the 
past, and appear to be quite similar to those found elsewhere in central and 
eastern Europe: urban-rural differences, the political needs of the peasantry, the 
peculiar characteristics of the industrial class, ultra-nationalism, and the persis-
tence of the reconstructed Communist Party. These conflicts in turn have been 
reflected in various partisan formations and electoral coalitions. 
In contrast to Romania, the noncommunist opposition in Poland was able to 
fashion a broad-based organizational challenge in advance of free elections. 
Solidarity emerged under the old system and had aspirations to continuing its 
role as a "catchall" aggregator of the Polish vote. However, like most umbrella 
formations, divisions occurred over personalities and programs. Solidarity is 
already badly divided, and voter loyalty may dissolve even further as other 
deep-seated traditions (e.g., nationalism, religious sentiment) or newer issues 
emerge. 
The 1990 presidential election in Poland was a defining political event. It 
aroused the electorate, brought latent political issues to the surface, and helped 
establish electoral bases for the major political cleavages in post-Communist 
Poland. Virtually all of the current major electoral cleavages in Poland can be 
traced back to political manifestations which were first expressed in the 1990 
presidential election. 
Six candidates qualified for the First round of the two-Ballot presidential 
race in November 1990: Lech Walesa (Solidarity), Tadeusz Masowiecki (cen-
terliberal groups), Roman Bartoszcze (Polish Peasant Party), Leszek Moczulski 
(anti-Communist, nationalist right), Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz (reconstructed 
Communist Party), and Stanislaw Tyminski (independent). Several candidates 
representing various fringe groups were unable to generate the required 
100,000 signatures suggesting they were either unpopular or their programs 
had little mass support. 
By far the most interesting candidate was Tyminski whose shadowy back-
ground as an outsider and a self-made millionaire coupled with his effective 
use of the media generated considerable political interest among a
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newly-aroused electorate. Unlike the other candidates, Tyminski had no ties to 
established political groups in Poland, and was untainted by recent political 
history. His antiestablishment message found considerable support among the 
disenchanted and confused electorate. 
The geography of post-Communist elections in Poland reveals a number of 
interesting patterns, including some that reflect important historical divisions 
associated with the various partitions of the country. Our analysis is based an 
the aggregate distribution of the vote across 49 voivodships.3 As expected, 
Walesa became the leading candidate in 1990, although not without challenge. 
Surprisingly, Tyminski took the lead in four voivodships (Katowice, Leszno, 
Olsztyn, Pila) an the first ballot. While Tyminski's core support was scattered 
and non-contiguous, Walesa's lead over Tyminski was greater than 10 percent 
in the eastern voivodships, but dropped to 10 percent or less in the West of 
Poland. 
The Walesa-Masowiecki contest also displayed distinct geographical pat-
terns, especially in the contiguous nature of their respective electoral bases. 
With the exception of Warsaw (25%) and Lodz (20%), Masowiecki's base of 
support (over 16% of the vote) was confined to the region of western Poland. 
His support declined as one moved east. With the exception of Gdansk, 
Walesa's base formed a narrow region in eastern Poland. 
The electoral geography of the minor candidates is also worth noting. Bar-
toszcze was the candidate of the Peasant Party and, as expected, he did well in 
the agricultural regions, especially in southeastern Poland. With the exception 
of Pila, his base of support was also fairly contiguous. Electoral support for the 
reconstructed Communist candidate Cimoszewicz was spread around Poland 
most likely due to the geographically diffuse nomenklatura of the old regime. 
With few exceptions (e.g., Gdansk and Kielce), his base of support tended to 
form an inverted U-shape running from east to north to west across Poland. 
The geography of support for the presidential candidates appeared to be sensi-
tive to both political traditions and to one or more key socioeconomic indica-
tors - a relationship which provides us with some insight into the probable 
nature of their respective electoral bases. One crucial political variable we 
might label "Solidarity Traditions" - a characteristic of those regions in which 
Solidarity union support has been persistently strong over the years. A crude 
indicator of this variable is support for Solidarity candidates in the free Senate 
election of June 1989 as measured by the average Solidarity vote in
                                                          
3 The ecological information for Poland consists of subnational political and socioeconomic 
data measured at the voivodship and election district levels. Poland is divided into 49 voivod-
ships including the 3 urban districts of Warsaw, Krakow, and Lodz. Data sources for Poland 
include Maty Rocznik Statystyczny (Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, various issues); Monitor 
Polski Nr. 50; and various issues of Rzeczpospolita. I am indebted to Dr. Krzysztof Jasiewicz 
for supplying detailed regional breakdowns of the Polish vote. 
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each voivodship for that election. In those regions where “Solidarity Tradi-
tions” were strong, Walesa's first ballot lead over Tyminski improved dramati-
cally (r = +.70) and Tyminski's electoral support declined (r = -.48). Support for 
Cimoszewicz was also weak in areas of strong "Solidarity Traditions" (r = -.59) 
- the only deviant case being Bialystok which was Cimoszewicz's home region. 
The urban-rural or developmental cleavage appears if we examine levels of 
urbanization and development across the voivodships in relation to electoral 
support for both Masowiecki and Bartoszcze. The stark regional differences 
between the bases of the liberal-center and peasant interests can be seen in the 
correlations reported in Table 3. Using standard socioeconomic indicators, the 
correlations suggest that party space in the rural agricultural areas is already 
being occupied by a strong established Peasant Party. The correlations also 
indicate the difficulty of any liberal expansion beyond their base of support in 
developed Poland. 
As noted in the case of Romania, this cleavage appears to be a fundamental 
one in central and eastern Europe, and it is likely to be a persistent factor in 
future electoral contests. Clearly there are differential political and economic 
needs in the urban and rural environments and we would expect to find them 
manifested in the structuring Poland's emergent party system. Similar to Ro-
mania, we find that electoral support for liberal values, policies and candidates 
is largely an urban phenomenon, whereas the rural areas appear to be more 
conservative, and somewhat skeptical of major change. 
One measure of media effects on the campaign can be found in support for 
Masowiecki and communication indicators such as newspaper sales per capita 
(r = +.87) and the number of television subscribers (r = +.71). The correlations 
are quite high in a positive direction. Masowiecki did best in areas of high 
media density, suggesting considerable support from urban and intellectual 
classes. 
The geography of Tyminski's electoral support reflects a deepening division 
between developed and backward Poland, and explains to some degree why he 
emerged as the protest candidate. Although the correlations were moderate in 
magnitude, Tyminski's support tended to be highest in areas of "backward" 
Poland as measured by standard development indicators (urbanization, tele-
phones per capita, physicians per capita, newspaper sales, etc.). His support 
was strongest in small and medium-size towns (Jasiewicz, 1992c, p. 191). 
Tyminski appeared to benefit from television exposure. This would seem to be 
a perfect strategy for a protest candidate - directed appeals to the disenchanted 
through the controlled images of television. 
The second ballot produced a surprise run-off between Walesa and Ty-
minski. While Walesa won overwhelming with 74.2 percent compared to Ty-
minski’s 25.7 percent, his victory was less spectacular considering that a little 
over half of the eligible voters participated in the run-off election. Walesa's actual 
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support amounted to a modest 38.4 percent of the total electorate. lf we con-
sider gains in support between the two ballots, there is some evidence an the 
basis of correlations that the Masowiecki (r = +.90) and Moczulski (r = +.47) 
electorates shifted their support to Walesa in the run-off. Supporters of Bar-
toszcze (r = +.48) and Cimoszewicz (r = +.75) appeared to have shifted to 
Tyminski. Tyminski's gain between the two ballots averaged 4.5 percentage 
points. The area of greatest gain (17.8 points) was in Bialystok - the core area 
of support for Cimoszewicz an the first ballot. However, Tyminski's second 
ballot support did not extend beyond the original base of underdeveloped Po-
land, and he lost some of the more developed areas such as Katowice. Al-
though viewed as something of a "flash" phenomenon, the protest electorate as 
represented by the Tyminski-Communist support pattern is likely to continue as 
a major unpredictable factor in Polish politics. One of his strongest group of 
supporters was the 18 to 25 age cohort (Jasiewicz, 1992c, p. 192). 
The legislative elections of 1991 produced a fragmented and ineffective par-
liament due to extremely liberal rules of representation. The legislative elec-
tions of September 1993 were conducted under more conservative rules which 
penalized fragmentation and encouraged coalition-building. The 1993 election 
produced three important results: (1) a simplification of the Polish party system 
in terms of representation, (2) a strengthening of the left (Alliance of the De-
mocratic Left [SLD] and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]), and (3) an increase in 
the politicization of socioeconomic differences as reflected in electoral support 
for the major parties. The key variables continue to be urban-rural differences, 
variations in the level of economic development across Poland, the conflict 
between beneficiaries and losers from reform, and the geography of unem-
ployment. 
Once again, by examining the geographical relationship between voter sup-
port for the elections of 1990 (presidential), 1991 and 1993 (legislative), and 
various socioeconomic indicators measured at the voivodship level, we gain 
considerable insight into the dynamics of mass politics in contemporary Po-
land. There is a minor problem of comparability across elections. The 1990 
presidential election was conducted using the 49 voivodships; the 1991 election 
was based an 37 redrawn election districts involving various aggregations of 
voivodships; the 1993 legislative election returned to the voivodship as the 
basic electoral unit but subdivided Warsaw (2) and Katowice (3) for a total of 
52 districts. Fitting the data to the various aggregations, however, has not re-
sulted in any major distortions of the results. 
There is now abundance empirical evidence confirming that the dominant 
parties (SLD, PSL, and Democratic Union [UD]) have established geographical 
bases across Poland as a result of three major post-Communist elections. We 
have focused on the correlates of the 1993 vote for these three parties in Table 
4. The geographical core of the SDL was already apparent in the presidential 
election of 1990. There is a strong relationship between the SLD vote in 1993 
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and first ballot support for Cimoszewicz, the Communist candidate, in 1990 (r 
= +.68). This relationship not only continues to hold but was strengthened 
between 1991 and 1993. The correlation between the SLD vote in 1991 and 
1993 is quite high (r = +.83). It is interesting to note that Cimoszewicz only 
received 9.2 percent (1.5 million votes) in 1990 compared to the 2.8 million 
votes received by the SLD in 1993. The growing strength of the SDL is likely 
to be felt in the next presidential election. 
There is also evidence that the SLD vote captured a good portion of the Ty-
minski electorate and has come to represent geographical pockets of long-term 
discontent in Poland. For example, if we consider Tyminski's 1990 presidential 
support as a major indicator of protest and discontent among the Polish elector-
ate, we note a significant positive correlation between his second ballot support 
and votes for the SLD in 1993 (r = +.66). Perhaps even more convincing is the 
positive relationship (r = +.54) involving Tyminski's percentage point gain 
between the two presidential ballots in 1990 and the electoral geography of the 
SLD in 1993. 
Support for the SLD was also stronger in the urbanized areas of western Po-
land, although some areas of eastern Poland (e.g., Bialystok and Chelm) also 
manifested high levels of support. Short term economic protest also appears to 
be an important component of the SLD electoral base. There is also overlap 
between the geography of unemployment (May 1993) and the SLD vote in 
1993 (r = +.44). 
The geography of the SLD vote in 1993 suggests the possibility of a more 
complex explanatory model which might be used to characterize fundamental 
components of SLD support. We can conceptualize the model as having three 
basic components: (1) electoral traditions (measured in terms of previous elec-
toral support), (2) economic discontent (measured by the unemployment rate), 
and voter turnout (controlling for variations in electoral participation). The 
following regression model was derived using the above variables as predictors 
of the SLD vote in 1993: 
SLD (1993) = -.81 + 1.15(SLD 1991) + .26(V) + .10(U)  
R = .92 R2 = .85 
Where: 
SLD (1993) = Percent SLD vote in 1993 
SLD (1991) = Percent SLD vote 1991 
V = Percent voter turnout (1993) 
U = Percent unemployment (May 1993) 
Using the technique of regression analysis, we find the model to be highly 
efficient in that 85 percent of the geographical variation in the 1993 SLD vote 
can be accounted for by these three variables. In fact, previous SLD voting and 
unemployment together account for nearly 75 percent of the variation in the 
1993 SLD vote. One could also substitute Tyminski’s support in 1990 for
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previous left voting (SLD 1991) in the above equation and still arrive at ap-
proximately the saure amount of explanatory variance. The regression model 
does mask the individual contributions of the variables. If wo begin wich un-
employment (U), the multiple correlation (R) is .44. If wo then add previous 
voting for the SLD in 1991, the multiple correlation increases to .86. In the 
equation above, the effects of unemployment (U) are somewhat lessened be-
cause of its apparent relationship with core areas of SLD support (i.e., SLD 
vote in 1991). 
The Polish Peasant Party (PSL), which received 15.4 percent of the vote in 
1993, became the second-ranked dominant party in the Polish Sejm. The bases 
of PSL support are highly regionalized in the rural areas of central and western 
Poland. Similar to the SLD, support for the PSL has been built up around an 
electoral base First manifested in 1990 with the presidential candidacy of Ro-
man Bartoszcze. The 1993 PSL vote was highly correlated with Bartoszcze's 
1990 vote (r = +.86), and with the PSL vote in 1991 (r = +.70). 
As expected, support for the PSL in 1993 was negatively related to indica-
tors of industrial development (r = -.77) and urbanization (r = -.82). There is 
also some evidence based an unreported correlations that areas of PSL support 
are characterized by the presence of older populations as reflected in higher 
death rates, as well as those which have experienced population losses through 
out-migration as a result of economic decline. 
The liberal Democratic Union (UD) is the third-ranked party in the Sejm re-
ceiving 10.6 percent of the vote in 1993. The electoral geography of the UD 
suggests it is located largely in northwestern and southwestern Poland with a 
few pockets of strength in the Center. The UD appears to have difficulty in 
both defining and holding an to its electoral base. The most significant political 
correlation was between the 1993 UD vote and Walesa's percentage point gain 
between the two ballots in the 1990 presidential election (r = +.84). The corre-
lation of UD support with voter turnout was also mildly positive (r = +.46). 
In socioeconomic terms, the UD appears to reflect an urban-industrial elec-
torate where higher levels of economic well-being and the benefits of reform 
are likely to be felt. The following correlations with the 1993 UD vote tend to 
support this view: urbanization (r = +.80), industrial development (r = +.76), 
unemployment (r = -.30), rate of growth of privatization (r = +.35), and the rate 
of in-migration (r = +.33). 
Minor parties such as the nationalist Confederation for an Independent Po-
land (KPN) also appear to have established regional bases of support. The 
geography of the KPN is highly regionalized in southeastern Poland and the 
western district of Szczecin. The KPN with 5.8 percent of the vote and 22 seats 
in 1993 did much better than its 1990 presidential candidate Leszek Moczulski 
who garnered only 2.5 percent. The correlation between Moczulski's support in 
1990 and the 1993 KPN vote was significant (r = +.67). 
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The evidence derived from an examination of Poland's electoral geography 
suggests that partisan differences are beginning to take shape, indeed solidify 
around distinct bases of support in Polish society. A degree of "freezing" of the 
party system is in evidence with regard to the major formations. The major 
parties appear to be highly regionalized reflecting the needs and interests of 
various cultural, ideological, and socioeconomic strata in Polish society. Even 
the centrist groups which have exhibited more electoral volatility appear to 
conform to this pattern. Virtually all of the current electoral divisions in Poland 
can be traced back to the political manifestations which emerged in the defin-
ing 1990 presidential election. The major parties have not only continue to 
build on this initial base of support, but in some cases have also reached back 
into Polish history. 
Conclusion 
Our purpose in this article has been to examine emerging trends in mass poli-
tics of the new democracies of central and eastern Europe as they enter the 
post-Communist period. We have singled out Poland and Romania as case 
studies in order to document what appear to be fundamental empirical relation-
ships between societal divisions and the vote, as manifested in the First democ-
ratic elections in over forty years. While we have observed significant continui-
ties in political identification and voter support of a functional nature, the terri-
torial dimension of regionalism and ethnicity also have played a decisive role 
decisive role, followed by sharp differences over the policies of economic 
reform. In both countries, the structuring of mass politics has already taken 
place around these basic divisions. Their durability will be tested in future 
electoral contests. 
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